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Abstract
The feed-in tariff regulation is the wider spread promotion scheme used to encourage
the take-up and development of generation from renewable energy sources in the EU, and
the costs of resources devoted to this promotion are usually borne by final consumers.
Two components of the electricity retail price are expected to be influenced by feed-in
tariff regulation: the incentive to those firms producing electricity from renewable en-
ergy sources and the wholesale price of electricity. In this study we analyze the effects
that feed-in tariff regulation has on electricity retail price for industrial consumers. This
analysis is performed by estimating the relative intensity of the effects from the cost of
incentives for electricity generation under the feed-in tariff and the electricity wholesale
price over the Spanish industrial retail price. Especial attention is devoted to technology-
specific considerations, as well as short and long run effects. In general, results show that
there is not a strong link between the retail and wholesale market for Spanish industrial
consumers. Moreover, taking into account technology-specific characteristics, results in-
dicates that an increase of solar generation leads to a higher increase in the industrial
retail price than in the case of a proportional increase of wind generation. This implies
that, when evaluating the feed-in tariff regulation impact on the industrial retail price,
the cost of incentives effect prevails over the wholesale price effect, and this is stronger
for solar than for wind generation.
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1 Introduction
Within the European Union (EU) 2020 energy strategy, the Third Energy Package aimed to
complete the liberalization process, and the Climate and Energy Package implemented the
targets for 2020 (known as the “20-20-20” targets). One of the targets was raising the share of
EU energy consumption produced from renewable resources to 20% (Directive (2009/28/EC).
EU countries embraced this target promoting the production of electricity from renewable
energy sources (RES), and the feed-in tariff (FIT) regulation is the wider spread promotion
scheme used to encourage the take-up and development of generation from RES. Basically,
under the FIT regulation a specific price is guaranteed per electricity produced by generators
of the targeted technologies.
In most EU countries the costs of resources devoted to promote the production of electric-
ity from RES are borne by final consumers. Recent years’ recession has made Europe’s
governments, industry and consumers worried about high energy prices, and some blame is
attributed to climate policies in general and to FIT in particular. In Spain, around 8 Bn Eu-
ros a year, on average, have been devoted to promote the production of electricity from RES
during the last four years. This amount of resources represents around 12% of the industry
GDP. Given that these costs are translated to final consumers through the electricity bill, it
is worth thinking over the implications that this policy has on retail prices. Electricity is a
highly relevant economic factor, therefore, policy and regulatory decisions affecting its price
should be deeply analysed given the direct effect that energy prices have on the production
costs of firms and, hence, in terms of welfare. However, there is no empirical assessment of
the actual impact that this scheme has over final consumer (retail) prices.
Two components of the electricity retail price are expected to be influenced by FIT regu-
lation; the incentive to those firms producing electricity from RES and the wholesale price
of electricity. On the one hand, from the characteristics of the electricity wholesale price
(WP) formation (merit of order) and the low marginal cost of renewable energy generation,
the introduction of RES in the energy mix is expected to exert a downward pressure on the
WP of electricity. This effect over the WP is represented on the Wholesale Market graph in
Figure 1. On the other hand, from the regulatory design of the incentive mechanisms the FIT
costs (FITC) are charged to the final electricity consumers. Hence, acting over the electricity
retail price in opposite directions (see Retail Market graph in Figure 1), both components are
functions of the proportion of renewable sources in the energy mix. Therefore, to assess the
overall effect of RES promotion the research question is on the relative intensity that these
two components exert over electricity retail prices.
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Figure 1: FIT Regulation Effects
With the exceptions of Finland and The Netherlands where the FITC are completely financed
by general taxes, in EU countries the costs of promoting RES are borne by final electricity
consumers. Depending on the regulatory design, the FITC might be translated into the elec-
tricity prices by two basic ways; non-tax levies and pass down to end users of suppliers costs
(CEER, 2013)1, and in both the FITC are translated to the retail price after the wholesale
price is set. Hence, the more common regulatory design is one in which the FITC are borne
by final consumers without impacting the wholesale price market formation mechanism. This,
along with the data availability for Spain, and the fact that in the EU context Spain is one
of the countries with the highest renewable power capacity2 (with Germany and Italy), wind
power generation penetration (with Germany and Denmark), and solar power generation pen-
etration (with Germany), are the main reasons why this study is applied to Spain.
In order to stimulate the development of certain technologies, the basic feature of FIT is to
guarantee generators of the targeted technologies a specific price per electricity produced. In
Spain the FIT is granted to generation from RES and cogeneration plants with an installed
capacity below 50MW (this is the so called Special Regime -SR). To take into account that
different technologies have different levels of development and generation costs, the supports
are technology-specific granted. Figure 2 shows the yearly average FITC (in AC/MWh) in
Spain by technology during the last four years. While solar technology was granted with an
average of 375 AC/MWh produced, in the case of wind and small hydro was an average of 83
AC/MWh, for cogeneration (COG) and other renewable the average FIT was 110 AC/MWh.
It is also important to highlight that wind and solar technologies make different contribu-
tions of electricity to the system during the day, which are characterized by different demand
profiles. While wind power contribution is in relative terms higher during off-peak hours, the
1 To be more precise, while the non-tax levies are used in Austria, Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Slovenia, and Spain, the pass down to end users of suppliers costs is used in Belgium, Czech
Republic, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, and UK.
2 Excluding hydropower.
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Figure 2: Yearly Average FITC (in AC/MWh)
Source: Own elaboration based on Spanish national regulatory agency information
opposite happens with solar power which is generated during daylight (peak hours). More-
over, the technologies within the FIT scheme provided different contributions to the energy
consumed (see Figure 3); while during the last years wind covered on average around 20% of
the total load, solar covered 5% in the best case, small hydro only 3% or less, other renewable
2% or less, and COG (non-renewable) covered about 13% of the load. Hence, technology
specific considerations are important not only from the FITC perspective but also on the WP
perspective, and this is carefully taken into account in the empirical study presented here.
Figure 3: Yearly Average % of Load
Source: Own elaboration based on Spanish national regulatory agency information
To the best of our knowledge, none of the previous work has assessed empirically from a
disaggregated perspective the effect from both determinants (FITC and WP) on retail price.
Therefore, this paper aims to contribute to the empirical analysis of the effect that the FIT
regulation has over the electricity retail price for industrial consumers by quantifying the
relative intensity of the FITC and the WP of electricity. Especial attention is devoted to
technology-specific considerations, as well as short and long run effects.
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This article is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the links to the existing literature.
Section 3 describes the data and models used to estimate the retail price effects of the feed-in
tariff regulation. Section 4 presents the estimation and results of our analysis. Finally, section
5 discusses, interprets, and contextualizes our findings.
2 Links to the existing literature
Previous studies for different countries have analyzed (ex-ante and ex-post) the additional
cost from supporting FIT, estimated the potential benefits from the merit of order effect, and
compared aggregated figures of the potential cost savings from higher RES to direct costs of
the FIT. Below we describe the main finding of these three closely related branches of the
energy economics literature.
Numerous ex-ante studies calculate the additional cost from supporting schemes to electricity
generated from RES. Ragwitz et al. (2007) predicted that it was necessary a steady rise of
the average EU consumer price between 5.0 AC/MWh and 7.7 AC/MWh over the period 2005-
2010 to finance the RES deployment. In the German case, Frondel et al. (2010) calculated
(dividing the overall amount of FIT of about 9 Bn ACby the overall electricity consumption of
617 Bn kWh) that in 2008 the price mark-up due to the FIT was about 7.5% of the average
household electricity price. Using a quantitative electricity market model that accounts for
factors such as oligopolistic behavior, emission trading, and restricted cross-border transmis-
sion capacities, Traber and Kemfert (2009) also find an upward price effect of the German
FIT. Relatively few ex-post studies have analyzed the price effects of FIT regulation. Del Rio
and Gual (2007) assess the effect of the Spanish FIT between 1999 and 2003 in terms of
additional costs paid by consumers for renewables compared to conventional electricity (i.e.
the share of RES promotion of the electricity bill). Their study finds that the additional cost
for the consumer increased annually by 23% during the period considered.
As previously mentioned, some properties of RES generation could also potentially coun-
teract the upward-price effect associated with FIT regulation. In the wholesale electricity
market the supply curve is constructed by ordering the bids of all generators from lowest to
highest. These bids should equate the marginal costs of the generators and, therefore, the
supply curve reflects the aggregate marginal cost curve for the market (if no market power
exists). The market price is set at the intersection of the supply and demand curves, and all
generators with lower marginal costs serve demand receiving this uniform price. The intro-
duction of technologies under the FIT tends to shift the supply curve to the right, due to
its low marginal cost of generation, which pushes more expensive marginal plants (e.g. coal,
combined cycle, petroleum, etc.) out of the market, and exerts a downward pressure on the
wholesale price of electricity (see Wholesale Market graph in Figure 1). This is called the
merit of order effect, a well documented feature of wholesale prices in context of FIT.
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Traber and Kemfert (2011), using a mixed complementary program computational model,
find that higher wind supply reduces German market prices by more than 5%. Gelabert et al.
(2011), using a multivariate regression model of daily average Spanish electricity prices for
2005 to 2009, also find that a marginal increase of 1 GWh of electricity from RES and COG
is associated with a reduction of 1.9 AC/MWh (3.7%) in wholesale electricity prices. Following
a similar methodological approach Würzburg et al. (2013) find that in Germany and Austria
electricity price fell by roughly 1 AC/MWh (around 2% of the electricity price) for each ad-
ditional GWh of average daily renewable electricity generation between July 2010 and June
2012.
Finally, there are studies that, in an attempt to account for both effects, compare the po-
tential cost savings from higher RES to direct costs of the FIT with either or both effects
considered at an aggregated level. This is the case of the study by Sensfub et al. (2008), which
offers a detailed analysis of the price effects of renewable electricity generation on German
wholesale prices between 2001 and 2006. When comparing the computed cost savings due to
RES feed-in to the total costs of the FIT in 2006 they find that the cost savings outweighed
the total costs. Similarly, Saenz de Miera et al. (2008), through a simulation analysis for the
Spanish wholesale price, find that when comparing the simulated reduction of the wholesale
price of electricity as a result of more wind generation with the total yearly support for wind
generation, there are net saving costs for consumers from the FIT scheme. Likewise, Ciarreta
et al. (2014) compared the computed savings from the merit of order effect with the yearly
total amount of subsidies in Spain. The authors find that while the cost savings exceed the
subsidies between 2008 and 2009, the opposite was true between 2010 and 2012. Also for the
Spanish case, Burgos-Payan et al. (2013) compared the aggregated cost and benefits from the
FIT system over the period 2008-2009 and find that the magnitude of both effects are roughly
counterbalanced.
Our research is related with the above literature, more closely related to the last group given
that we account for both effects, although from a disaggregated perspective. More precisely,
through the estimation of three econometric models, this paper contributes to the empiri-
cal assessment of the effect that the FIT regulation has over the industrial retail price of
electricity by quantifying its sensibility to the incentives for electricity generation under the
FIT and the electricity wholesale price. Especial attention is devoted to technology-specific
considerations. In the next section we present the empirical approach and the data used to
perform the analysis of the effects that the FIT regulation has on Spanish electricity retail
prices for industrial consumers.
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3 Data and methods
The empirical assessment of the effect that the FIT regulation has over electricity retail price
(RP) has been developed through the estimation of a RP equation which allows us to quantify
the relative intensity of the effects from both the FITC and the WP of electricity. This as-
sessment is performed in a two steps strategy using weekly data. First, we estimate an inverse
supply equation Eq.(1) where WP as function of the energy supply mix and the load (equi-
librium quantity), and a FITC equation Eq.(2) capturing the effect that the daily electricity
production by RES and COG has on the cost per unit of electricity consumption. Second,
we introduce the estimates of WP and FITC (along with additional controls) into the RP
equation Eq.(3) to evaluate the relative intensity of both components. Below we describe the
models and data used to estimate the retail price effects of the feed-in tariff regulation.
(1)∆WPt = β0 + β1∆WPt−1 + β2∆Loadt + β3∆Mixt
+ ∆β4Yt + ∆β5Qt + ∆β6Mt + ∆β7Wt + ε1t
σ21t = δ0 + δ1ε
2
1t (1.1)
(2)∆FITCt = λ0 + λ1∆FITCt−1 + λ2∆Mixt
+ λ3∆Yt + λ4∆Qt + λ5∆Mt + λ6∆Wt + λ7ε2t−1 + ε2t
(3)
∆RPt = α0 + α1∆RPt−1 + α2∆ŴP t + α3∆F̂ ITCt
+ α4∆Yt + α5∆Qt + α6∆Mt + α7∆Wt + ε3t
We analyzed the FIT effect on the wholesale market price (WPt) in Eq. (1) following the
empirical strategy of estimation in differences as Gelabert et al. (2011) and Würzburg et al.
(2013). In addition to the load (∆Loadt) and the electricity generation by energy source
(∆Mixt which includes wind, solar, other renewable, cogeneration, combined cycle, nuclear,
coal and hydro), we introduce an autoregressive component (∆WPt−1) to capture dynamic
effects, and an ARCH variance to account for the increasing volatility effects that are observ-
able in the first difference of the WPt series (see Figure 4).
The residuals in Eq. (1) are defined as an autoregressive process where all ε1t are of the form
ε1t = Zt σ
2
1t with Ztv (0,1), and Dv (0,1) is the probability density function of the residuals
with zero mean and unit variance. Eq. (1.1) represents the variance equation of the ARCH
process. The wholesale price data were obtained from market operator (OMEL) and data on
electricity generation by energy source were obtained from the transmission system operator
(REE).
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Figure 4: Wholesale Price (first differences)
Following the same empirical strategy as in the ∆WPt model, for the analysis of the feed-in
tariff costs the estimation is performed in differences with a lag dependent variable ∆FITCt−1.
Eq. (2) represents the change in the cost of the FIT per unit of electricity consumption
(∆FITCt) capturing the effect from change in the composition of electricity production
by different sources (wind, solar, small hydro, other renewable, and cogeneration) covered
through the FIT system (∆Mixt). Unlike in the case of ∆WPt, the ∆FITCt variance (de-
spite its volatility which is high but not increasing, see Figure 5) does not follow an ARCH
process. However, the ∆FITCt series does follows a moving-average process of first order,
for this reason we introduce ε2t−1 component.
To obtain the weekly ∆FITCt the following procedure is used. First, in the same line as
Burgos-Payn et al. (2013), from the CNE statistics3 on FIT payments we take the yearly
amount of Euros by technology devoted to the incentives of firms producing electricity from
RES and COG. Second, the yearly amount of Euros per technology is weighted by the daily
proportion of their yearly production (Prod-day / Prod-year) and added to obtain the daily
cost of FIT. Third, to account for volume differences, we compute the cost of the FITs per
unit of electricity consumption (load). Finally, we compute the weekly average.
3 “Informacion Estadistica sobre las Ventas de Energia del Regimen Especial”, available at www.cne.es
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Figure 5: Feed-in Tariff Cost (first differences)
The period covered for the estimation of the wholesale price and the feed-in tariff cost equa-
tions is from November 2009 to July 2013 (195 weeks). The selection of this period is moti-
vated by regulatory stability and data reliability: up to October 2009 the distribution com-
panies were in charge of handling the FIT payments to the Special Regime (SR) producers.
Since November 2009 the CNMC is responsible for the FIT payments, providing public and
reliable information on those payments4.
The analysis of effect that the FIT regulation has over electricity retail price (RPt) is per-
formed through the estimation of Eq. (3), which quantifies the retail price change as a function
of changes from both the cost of the incentive to electricity generation under the FIT and
the wholesale price of electricity. To capture dynamic effects an autoregressive term (RPt−1)
was introduced in the model. ŴP t is the estimated weekly average of the (day-ahead) spot
market price capturing the effect from the composition of electricity production by energy
sources (Eq. (1)). F̂ ITCt is the estimated FIT cost per unit of electricity consumption cap-
turing the effect from the electricity production by RES and COG (Eq. (2)).
According to the Spanish price design, the industrial retal price (RP, excluding taxes) is the
result of adding the Access Tariff (AT ), the Net Retail Margins (NRM ) and the Whole-
sale Cost (WC ). The AT data comes from Spanish national regulatory agency the National
Commission of Markets and Communications (by its acronym in Spanish CNMC, previously
4 In practice it is possible to obtain the payments by both as a direct tariff or as a premium over the market
price, here we use the total resources (the FITC) because captures the overall cost of the policy.
9
named National Commission of Energy, CNE) reports on monitoring the retail market5. The
NRM, obtained from the same source, were computed quarterly by the CNMC based on two
forward purchasing strategies by retailers (see (CNE, 2013)). We follow the same methodol-
ogy for one forward purchasing strategy to approach their WC on rolling basis; using weekly,
monthly and quarterly contracts (see Appendix for additional details on the RP proxy)6.
In order to develop comprehensive empirical estimations weekly data for the period between
April 2010 and June 2012 is used (116 weeks). The selection of this period is motivated by
data availability. Figure 6 shows the industrial retail price in first differences.
Figure 6: Retail Price (first differences)
Finally, it is importan to highlight that in all three equations the seasonality is controlled
using fourth set of dummies variables: yearly (∆Yt), quarterly (∆Qt), monthly (∆Mt), and
weekly (∆Wt) dummies. Table 1 shows the summary statistics of the data used. While all
prices and cost (RP, WP and FITC) are measured in AC/MWh, all electricity volumes are
measured in GWh.
5 “Informe de Supervision del Mercado Minorista de Electricidad Julio 2011 - Junio 2012”, ((CNE, 2013)).
More precisely we used the CNMC access tariff for the average industrial consumer according to the RD
110/2007 consumers classification.
6 As pointed out in CNE (2013) and Ofgem (2008), firms can employ a range of hedging strategies and these
may change over time. For practical purposes we used one of the two purchasing strategies employed by the
CNMC for industrial consumers. In the dynamic strategy we used, the supplier buys during remaining time
before the rolling period ends to cover the delivery, while in the other strategy the portfolio length is uniformly
distributed through the products within the rolling period. Given that our model is in first differences and
capture long-term effects, results are expected to be consistent to the use of different strategies.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
RP Industrial 116 79.8259 3.2661 69.7313 84.1047
WP 195 43.298 10.4807 3.25 63.6914
FITC 195 47.8293 10.1541 28.0443 82.564
Load 195 28.7619 2.0537 23.9702 34.1131
SR 195 11.2848 2.1422 7.0179 17.75
RES 195 7.5922 2.0167 3.994 13.6012
COG 195 3.693 0.2784 2.6667 4.2143
Wind 195 5.3534 1.969 1.9167 11.6012
Solar 195 1.073 0.5014 0.2396 2.4762
Hydro S 195 0.6869 0.2516 0.2083 1.1786
Hydro B 195 3.4741 1.677 1.3571 8.6905
Hydro T 195 4.161 1.8973 1.6667 9.7738
Other Renew 195 0.4788 0.0931 0.3155 0.6667
Nuclear 195 6.7936 0.8035 4.0833 7.8869
Coal 195 4.3477 2.1268 0.3036 9.1607
Comb Cycle 195 5.4349 2.2302 1.3452 11.5238
Once described the models and data used, we present the stationarity analysis of the series.
We performed two test, first, the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test (Dickey and Fuller,
1979) under the null hypothesis of a unit root and, second, the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-
Shin (KPSS) tests (Kwiatkowski et al., 1992) under the null hypothesis of stationarity. While
results of ADF test (see Table 2) in levels indicate that, we cannot reject the null hypothesis
of a unit root in WP, FITC or RP at any reasonable level of significance, results in first
differences indicate that we can reject the null hypothesis of a unit root for all three series. In
addition, KPSS results in levels indicate that we can reject the null hypothesis of stationarity
in WP, FITC and RP in any case, and in first difference that we cannot reject the null
hypothesis of stationarity at 1% level of significance. Both tests confirm that WP, FITC
and RP weekly series are stationary in first differences so we estimate the models in first
differences7.
Table 2: Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test
ADF test KPSS test
Levels First differences Levels First differences
Wholesale Price (WP) -3.061 -9.005*** 1.060*** 0.038
Feed-in Tariff Cost (FITC ) -3.247 -9.751*** 3.090*** 0.054
Retail Price (RP) -2.606 -4.695*** 2.350*** 0.541
Note: Test results are statistics. Lag length is determined by the Modified Akaike Information Criterion.
The trend was not significant in any case, hence, it was excluded. ADF null hypothesis of unit root.
KPSS null hypothesis of stationarity. *** Significant at 1%.
7 Furthermore, estimations results with absolute value of AR coefficients lower than one confirms the station-
arity of the series.
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4 Results
Given that the effects from FIT regulation come through the proportion and type of renew-
able sources in the energy mix, three set of estimations are perform for each equation with
different aggregations of the electricity mix. While in Set 1 a single variable captures the
electricity generated under the FIT system (SR), in Set 2 we distinguish between renewable
(RES) and cogeneration (COG) under the FIT system, and in Set 3 the renewable sources are
disaggregated in Wind, Solar, Small Hydro, and Other Renewable. In addition to electricity
generated under the FIT system, other main technologies of the energy mix are introduced
in the WP equation (Combined Cycle, Nuclear, Coal and Hydro8). Table 3 and Table 4
shows the results of the three maximum likelihood estimations with robust standard errors
for the ∆WPt (Eq. (1)) and ∆FITCt (Eq. (2)), respectively. We first present results from
all estimations with the short-run analysis. This is followed by a summary and comparison
between short-run and long-run implications.
In general, results from the WP equation are consistent with those of previous studies; the
introduction of RES exerts a downward pressure on the wholesale price of electricity. At
an aggregated level (Set 1), results indicates that in the short-run one additional GWh of
electricity generated under the FIT system (SR) decrease the WP (Table 3) in the magnitude
of 1.13 AC/MWh (-2.61%) and increase the FITC (Table 4) on 2.08 AC/MWh (4.35%). When
separating renewable from cogeneration (Set 2) results for renewable are very similar to the
aggregated FIT system, showing that an additional GWh of renewable production decrease
the WP in 1.09 AC/MWh (-2.53%) and an increase in 2.07 AC/MWh of the FITC (4.33%).
The renewable sources are disaggregated in the last group of estimations (Set 3). Results
shows that one additional GWh of wind production decrease the WP in the magnitude of
1.11 AC/MWh (-2.56%) and increase the FITC in 2.22 AC/MWh (4.66%). In the case of solar
production, an additional GWh decrease the WP 2.51 AC/MWh (-5.80%) and increase 9.94
AC/MWh the FITC (20.79%). Finally, cogeneration results shows that one additional GWh
of its production decrease the WP around 2.64 AC/MWh (-6.12%) and increases 4.62 AC/MWh
the FITC (9.67%).
8 Given that small hydro generation is part of the RES under the FIT system, to avoid double imputation
of small hydro in the mix, only big hydro generation was introduced as additional control in the first two
estimations of the WP. Furthermore, to avoid multicolineality problems coming from the high correlation
between small and big hydro, total hydro was introduce in the third estimation of the WP.
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Table 3: Wholesale Price
∆WPt (1) (2) (3)
∆WPt−1 -0.287*** -0.284*** -0.238***
(0.044) (0.044) (0.047)














∆CombCycle 0.322 0.365* 0.280
(0.210) (0.200) (0.258)
∆Nuclear -0.248 -0.267 -0.426
(0.270) (0.279) (0.370)






Constant 0.145 0.134 0.0379
(0.0945) (0.0900) (0.102)
δ1 0.870*** 0.752*** 0.728***
(0.367) (0.367) (0.339)
δ0 1.200** 1.083** 0.949***
(0.470) (0.457) (0.360)
Seasonality
Year Y Y Y
Quarter Y Y Y
Month Y Y Y
Week N N N
Observations 194 194 194
RSD of residuals 46.620 43.033 25.049
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * Significant
at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%. The 51
weekly dummies were excluded from the wholesale price sea-
sonality to allow the optimization of the ARCH process.
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Table 4: Feed-in Tariff Cost
∆FITCt (1) (2) (3)
















Constant 0.0816 0.0764 0.0612***
(0.057) (0.062) (0.016)
εt−1 2.170*** 2.203*** 2.168***
(0.367) (0.367) (0.339)
Seasonality
Year Y Y Y
Quarter Y Y Y
Month Y Y Y
Week Y Y Y
Observations 194 194 194
SD of residuals 46.620 43.033 25.049
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * Signif-
icant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%.
The other coefficients of the remaining explanatory variables are very similar across specifi-
cations. Besides, as measure of the statistical estimates reliability Table 3 and Table 4 shows
the relative standard deviation (RSD) and the standard deviation (SD) of residuals, respec-
tively. Decreasing value of both indicators with higher desaggregations of the electricity mix
(from Set 1 to Set 3), confirms the adequacy and relevance of technology consideration in
the context of this study. Furthermore, the models goodness of fit are very high as can be
seen in Figure 7 and Figure 8 showing the observed and predicted values from Eq.(1) and
Eq.(2), respectively. As a robustness check, when re-estimating the WP model including the
gas price as an additional control, the effect is positive but not significant, and the rest of
estimated coefficients remain unchanged. This not significant result might comes from the
fact that gas price effect it is captured, at least partially, by the combined cycle contribution
into the electricity mix.
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Figure 7: Goodness of fit Eq. (1)
Figure 8: Goodness of fit Eq. (2)
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Once considered the effect of electricity produced under the FIT regulation over the WP and
FITC, the overall impact of the FIT regulation on retail price will ultimately depend on the
relative intensities of the effects exerted through WP and FITC. This analysis is performed
through the estimation of the Eq. (3) for industrial consumers using the predicted values of
WP and FITC resulting from previous estimations.
Given that ŴP t and F̂ ITCt are both function of the energy mix some worries might arise
on effect over the retail price equation from the potentially high correlation between them.
Nonetheless, the correlation between the two estimated variables is -0.1318 for results in Set1,
-0.1321 in the Set2, and -0.1507 in the Set3. Results from estimations of Eq. (3) are presented
in Table 5.
Table 5: Retail Price Industrial
∆RPt (1) (2) (3)
∆RPt−1 0.154** 0.155** 0.178**
(0.073) (0.072) (0.076)
∆ŴP t 0.034*** 0.030*** 0.0367***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
∆F̂ ITCt 0.034*** 0.028*** 0.037***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Constant 0.059 0.060 0.057
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
Seasonality
Year Y Y Y
Quarter Y Y Y
Month Y Y Y
Week Y Y Y
Observations 116 116 116
SD of residuals 0.337 0.335 0.330
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * Signif-
icant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%.
In general, all estimations indicate that the short-run effects from changes in WP and FITC
on the RP change are small and similar. At an aggregated level (Set 1), results shows that an
increase of 1 AC/MWh in the WP and the FITC leads to increase the RP in 0.0337 AC/MWh
and 0.0344 AC/MWh respectively. Combining the estimated effects from Eq.(1) and Eq.(2)
over the WP and the FITC with these retail price effects9 we obtain that, from one additional
GWh of production under the FIT system (9% more) the RP increase in 0.042%. When sep-
arating renewable from cogeneration (Set 2), results are very similar showing that increase of
1 AC/MWh in the WP and the FITC leads to increase the RP in 0.0306 AC/MWh and 0.0283
9 The final short-run effect on the RP from one additional GWh of production is calculated as follows:
α2 * [β3 / WP ] + α3 * [λ2/FITC]
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AC/MWh respectively. Hence, an extra GWh of renewable production (13.2% more) increase
the RP in the short-run in 0.031%.
Finally, when renewable sources are disaggregated (Set 3), results shows that an increase of 1
AC/MWh in the WP and the FITC increases the RP in 0.0366 AC/MWh and 0.0373 AC/MWh
respectively. Therefore, short-run one additional GWh in the case of wind (18.7% more)
increase the RP in 0.053%, and in the case of solar (93.2% more) increase the RP in 0.349%.
As in previous models, using the standard deviation (SD) of residuals (see Table 4) as mea-
sure of the statistical estimates reliability, we observe that is has decreasing value with higher
disaggregation of the electricity mix (from Set 1 to Set 3). Besides, the retail price model
goodness of fit is very high as can be seen in Figure 9 showing the observed and predicted
values from the retail price equation.
Figure 9: Goodness of fit Eq. (3)
Estimated coefficients from lagged dependent variables were used compute the long-run ef-
fects10. A summary of the short-run and long-run effects FIT regulation in the average WP,
10 In each case, the long-run effects are calculated as follows:
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FITC and RP are presented in Table 6. In the case of the long-run effects it is interesting
to highlight that they decrease for WP and FITC with respect to those in the short-run,
the effect of one additional GWh of production under the FIT system over the WP and the
FITC is stronger in the short than in the long-run (β1 and λ1 are negative). The opposite
happened in for the RP, in the long-run the effect of additional production under the FIT
system increase with respect to those observed in the short-run (α1 is positive).
Table 6: Effects from one additional GWh of production
Short-Run SR RES Wind Solar
WP -2.61% -2.53% -2.56% -5.80%
FITC 4.35% 4.33% 4.66% 20.79%
RP 0.042% 0.031% 0.053% 0.349%
Long-Run SR RES Wind Solar
WP -2.02% -1.97% -2.07% -4.69%
FITC 3.54% 3.45% 3.47% 15.47%
RP 0.06% 0.04% 0.07% 0.49%
Note: 1 GWh represents 9%, 13.2%, 18.7% 93.2% and
27.1% of the average generation for SR, RES, Wind, Solar,
and COG, respectively.
5 Discussion and policy implications
In this study we analyzed the effects that feed-in tariff regulation has on Spanish electricity
retail prices. This analysis is performed by quantifying the relative effects of the cost of the
incentives for electricity generation under the FIT and the electricity wholesale price on the
industrial retail price.
At an aggregated level, results confirms that an increase of about 9% of the total production
under the FIT system leads to a decrease of 2.61% of the WP and an increase of 4.35% of
the FIT cost (FITC). Regarding final industrial consumers, the previous mentioned effects
over WP and FITC are translated into a 0.042% increase of the average retail price. These
results, although illustrative, must be carefully interpreted because do not take into account
the effect from different technologies.
One interesting finding from this study is that the effects from one additional GWh of solar
production on the WP and on the FITC is stronger than the effects from wind. In the case
of the WP this seems to be the confirmation of the differentiated effect from the fact that
WP: [β3 / 1- β1] / WP
FITC: [λ2 / 1- λ1] / FITC
RP: α2 * [β3 / 1- β1] / WP/[1-α1 ] + α3 * [λ2 / 1- λ1] / FITC/[1-α1 ]
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both technologies make different contributions of electricity to the system during the day,
characterized by different demand profiles. Even though solar contribution to the energy mix
is relatively small (less than 5% in average), given that it is available during peak hours, the
downward pressure that exerts over the WP is stronger than the one from wind with a higher
penetration (around 20%) but relatively stronger during off-peak hours. Nevertheless, this
would need a further evaluation using hourly data. In the case of FITC the stronger effect
from solar it is much more straightforward, it is capturing the extremely high FIT incentive
in terms of AC/MWh devoted to this technology.
Regarding the final impact on industrial retail price from previous mentioned result, the effect
of one additional GWh solar production is 6.6 higher that the effect coming from wind in the
short-run and 7.6 higher in the long-run. When looking at these effects, it is important to
highlight that one additional GWh of solar would imply increasing 93.2% its average gen-
eration while in the case of wind it would represent only an 18.7%. To place these results
into perspective, we compute the effects from a 10% increase of the average production from
both technologies on the average retail price. Result indicates that a 10% increase of solar
generation leads to an increase in the retail price which it is actually only 1.5 higher that the
effect coming from 10% more wind.
With respect to the small magnitude of the retail price effects, it has been recently pointed
out by the European Commission that, in an open and competitive retail market the pricing
signals should provide a strong link between the retail and wholesale market, and the final
consumers would then be able to adapt their economic decisions in line with the supply and
demand fundamentals. These conditions are rarely met in todays retail markets in the EU
(EC, 2014). From our analysis we conclude that there is not a strong link between the retail
and wholesale market for Spanish industrial consumers. This is possible the consequence of
a variety of factors and barriers that are limiting the retail market competition, and hence,
preventing final consumers from facing the potential welfare effects resulting of both, the
competitive wholesale market in which the feed-in tariff regulation it is exerting an price
suppressing effect, and the cost of financing this renewable promotion mechanism.
From the above discussion it is apparent that, first, such regulations has implications above
and beyond the specific goals they were designed to achieve. Those responsible for introducing
regulations therefore need to be painstaking in their efforts when evaluating these implications
so as to anticipate their potentially negative effects. Second, measures to improve the retail
market competition are need. To split retails from vertically related operator might help
in this direction, as well as, the deployment of smart meters with bidirectional information
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Eq.(A0) represents the weekly Retail Price (RP) proxy as the result of adding the Access Tariff (AT ),
Net Retail Margins (NRM ) and the Wholesale Cost (WC ).
RP = AT +NRM +WC (A0)
The AT data comes from Spanish national regulatory agency (CNMC, previously named CNE) reports
on monitoring the retail market11,12. The NRM, obtained from the same source, were compute
quarterly by the CNMC based on two forward purchasing strategies by retailers (see CNE (2013)).
We follow the same methodology for one the forward purchasing strategy to approach their WC on
rolling basis, but with weekly frequency. Below we explain first the actual dynamics of the Spanish
future market products we used (weekly, monthly and quarterly), and second, the suppliers forward
purchasing strategy used to compute the WC.
Spanish future market products
There are three products from the Spanish future market that we use to compute the WC based on the
suppliers forward purchasing strategies; quarterly, monthly and weekly base load forward contracts.
Each contract name corresponds to the delivery period, for instance Q4 is a contract delivered during
the fourth quarter of the year (M1 is delivered during the first month, and W2 is delivered during the
second week). The three products not only differed on the length of delivery, but also on the time
between their first trading day and delivery period. As shown in Figure A1, while the first trading
day of quarterly products starts one year before the delivery of the first quarter, for monthly products
the first trading day is the first day one quarter before the quarter holding the month, and for weekly
products is the first day three weeks before the delivery week.
Figure A1: Future market products
11 “Informe de Supervision del Mercado Minorista de Electricidad Julio 2011 - Junio 2012”, (CNE (2013))
More precisely we used the CNMC access tariff for the average industrial consumer according to the RD
110/2007 consumers classification.
12 The AT includes the cost of transmission and distribution networks, market system interruptibility, extra-
peninsular cost, special regime, and a portion of previous years imbalance between regulated income and
costs, among others. In Spain, systematically the AT do not cover all the regulated costs.
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Suppliers forward purchasing strategy
We use the same methodology as CNMC for the forward purchasing strategy, consisting on combining
products with different lengths. To obtain higher frequency for the WC, in addition to the monthly
and quarterly contracts used by the CNMC, we also take into consideration the weekly contracts.
The strategy is a combination of weekly, monthly and quarterly products bought on rolling bases.
Therefore, after computing the price for the three alternative products, we combined them to obtain
the weekly WC by taking the average price of the three products during each week.
In this dynamic and rolling base strategy, the supplier buys during remaining time before the rolling
period ends to cover the delivery. Hence, the price for each product is the resulting from covering
one week ahead the delivery for each of the time horizons within the rolling period, weighted by the
number of horizons remaining before the rolling period ends.
In the case of quarterly products, the price with this purchasing strategy is the resulting from covering
one week ahead the delivery for each of the four quarter within the rolling year, weighted by the
number of quarter remaining before the rolling year ends. Figure A2 provides the example of the
purchasing strategy for Q4. The price of the coverage corresponding to Q4 is represented in Eq.(A1).
P (Q4Y ) = P1W (Q1Y ) ∗ 4 + P1W (Q2Y ) ∗ 3 + P1W (Q3Y ) ∗ 2 + P1W (Q4Y )/10 (A1)
Figure A2: Strategy for quarterly products (Q4 example)
With monthly products, as in the case explained before, the price is the resulting from covering one
week ahead the delivery for each of the three months within the rolling quarter, weighted by the
number of month remaining before the rolling quarter ends. Figure A3 provides the example of the
purchasing strategy for M12, and the price of the coverage corresponding to that month is represented
in Eq.(A2).
P (M12) = P1W (M10) ∗ 3 + P1W (M11) ∗ 2 + P1W (M12)/6 (A2)
Figure A3: Strategy for monthly products (M12 example)
In the case of weekly contracts (see Figure A4) there are four weeks to be cover within each rolling
month. Hence, following this strategy, the price corresponding the week 52 will be as represented in
Eq.(A3).
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P (W52) = P1W (W49) ∗ 4 + P1W (W50) ∗ 3 + P1W (W51) ∗ 2 + P1W (W52)/10 (A3)
Figure A4: Strategy for weekly products (W52 example)
After computing the price for the three alternative products that can be buy by retailers to cover their
supply each week, we combined them to obtain the WC by taking the average price for each week
during the sample period. The WC corresponding to the example explained above as represented in
Eq.(A4).
WC(W52) = P (Q4Y ) + P (M12) + P (W52)/3 (A4)
Finally, we combined the WC with the corresponding Net Retail Margins (NRM) (under the same
purchasing strategy and time period), and the Access Tariff (AT) to compute the weekly Retail Price
(RP). Eq. (A5) represents the retail price for the example week explained above:
RP (W52) = AT (Q4) +NRM(Q4) +WC(W52) (A5)
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